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Understanding	the	international	arbitration	of
investment	disputes	in	Europe
Until	Donald	Trump’s	election	campaign	in	2016,	it	appeared	as	if	the	United	States	was	dragging	the	increasingly
resistant	European	Union	into	the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	(TTIP).	The	settlement	of
investment	disputes	figured	prominently	among	the	reasons	for	the	anti-TTIP	mood	in	Europe.	For	instance,	an
article	in	the	Independent	in	2015	commented	that	“TTIP’s	biggest	threat	to	society	is	its	inherent	assault	on
democracy”	because	the	introduction	of	investor-state	dispute	settlements	(ISDS)	would	mean	that	“unelected
transnational	corporations	can	dictate	the	policies	of	democratically	elected	governments.”
Don’t	blame	the	United	States
Public	debate	in	EU	countries	has	conveyed	the	impression	that	mainly	US-based	companies	revert	to	international
arbitration	of	investment	disputes,	while	mainly	EU	governments	would	face	compensation	claims	and	feel	the
regulatory	chill.	What	is	more,	private	arbitrators	with	considerable	financial	interest	in	serving	corporate	clients
would	systematically	favour	the	claimants	and	take	position	against	respondent	states.
In	striking	contrast	to	what	public	debate	suggests,	the	collection	of	information	on	almost	800	cases	of	ISDS	since
the	1990s	by	the	United	Nations	Conference	of	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD)	reveals	that	European	investors
clearly	outnumber	private	claimants	from	other	regions.	European	claimants	have	been	involved	in	58%	of	all
disputes	listed	in	UNCTAD’s	database.	Figure	1	shows	that	European	investors,	and	among	them	primarily	EU
investors,	raised	250	claims	for	compensation	against	non-European	respondent	states,	compared	to	134	claims	by
the	three	NAFTA	members	against	third	countries.	At	the	same	time,	Europe	stands	out	in	terms	of	intra-regional
disputes	brought	to	international	arbitration.	About	one-third	of	all	disputes	included	in	the	database	were	brought
against	European	respondent	states;	most	of	these	disputes	(214	of	268)	were	initiated	by	European	claimants.
Figure	1.	Number	of	investment	disputes	within	and	between	regions
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Source:	UNCTAD,	ISDS	database
One	may	suspect	that	European	investors	are	no	more	litigious	than	non-European	investors	when	accounting	for
differences	in	outward	investment	positions.	Obviously,	the	number	of	disputes	may	increase	more	or	less
proportionately	with	stocks	of	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	held	abroad.	However,	even	this	relative	perspective
underscores	that	European	investors	are	far	more	active	as	claimants	in	ISDS	than	investors	based	in	NAFTA
member	countries	or	in	Asian	countries.
European	investors,	rather	than	American	or	Asian	investors,	are	also	to	blame	for	raising	a	relatively	higher	number
of	disputes	against	European	respondent	states,	when	accounting	for	the	distribution	of	Europe’s	inward	FDI	stocks
from	different	sources.	Non-EU	claimants	initiated	1.85	cases	of	ISDS	against	EU	countries	per	100	US$	billions	of
FDI	stocks	held	there	–	considerably	fewer	than	the	corresponding	number	of	2.48	cases	initiated	by	EU	claimants
against	EU	countries.
Rich	Europe	vs	poor	Europe
Focusing	on	intra-EU	disputes,	most	claims	(84	per	cent)	for	compensation	were	raised	by	investors	based	in
relatively	rich	EU	countries	against	relatively	poor	respondent	states.	In	relative	terms,	i.e.,	accounting	for	inward	FDI
stocks	from	EU	partner	countries,	the	top-10	targets	of	ISDS	within	the	EU	consisted	almost	exclusively	of	Central
European	countries.	Intra-EU	ISDS	involving	relatively	rich	respondent	states	(such	as	the	prominent	cases	raised	by
the	Swedish	energy	provider	Vattenfall	against	Germany)	represent	a	rare	exception.
Investors	win	only	so	often
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It	is	widely	believed	that	international	arbitration	of	investment	disputes	generally	favours	the	position	of	private
claimants	over	respondent	states.	The	legitimacy	crisis	of	ISDS	has	been	attributed	to	self-interested	and	biased
arbitrators.	Empirical	tests	of	these	hypotheses	are	largely	lacking,	however.	Making	use	of	UNCTAD’s	data	on
investor-state	disputes,	the	EU	evidence	rather	appears	to	be	in	striking	conflict	with	widely	held	views.
The	distribution	of	already	decided	cases	indicates	that	private	investors	win	less	frequently	over	respondent	states
than	one	might	have	expected.	Outright	investor	wins	account	for	just	10	per	cent	of	all	intra-EU	disputes.	Even	if	all
settlements	granted	compensation	to	investors,	state	wins	would	still	outnumber	outcomes	in	favour	of	investors	in
international	arbitration	of	intra-EU	disputes.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	discontinued	cases	tend	to	be	in	the	interest
of	respondent	states,	rather	than	in	the	interest	of	private	claimants,	notably	when	tribunals	dismiss	the	case	for	lack
of	jurisdiction.	Taken	together,	Figure	2	does	not	support	the	view	that	ISDS	outcomes	favour	private	claimants	over
respondent	states.
Figure	2.	Intra-EU	investment	disputes:	distribution	by	status	and	outcomes
Note:	‘Other’	includes	cases	with	missing	information	on	the	status	of	disputes	and	cases	decided	in	neither	party’s	favour.
Source:	UNCTAD,	ISDS	database.
A	possible	explanation	for	the	surprisingly	low	success	rate	of	private	claimants	in	intra-EU	ISDS	could	be	that
arbitration	tribunals	are	more	balanced	and	less	biased	than	critics	suspect.	Tribunals	typically	consist	of	three
arbitrators:	one	nominated	by	the	claimant,	another	nominated	by	the	respondent	state,	and	the	third	serving	as	the
president	on	whom	both	parties	have	to	agree.	While	the	president	can	be	expected	to	have	a	critically	important	say
on	ISDS	outcomes,	party-appointed	arbitrators	may	shape	outcomes	if	they	are	experienced	in	ISDS	(i.e.,	having
served	as	an	arbitrator	in	a	larger	number	of	disputes)	and	specialised	(or	‘biased’	in	terms	of	having	been	appointed
more	often	by	investors	or	states)	in	serving	the	interests	of	one	particular	party.
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Comparing	the	experience	and	bias	of	arbitrators,	the	first	thing	to	note	is	that	state-appointed	arbitrators	are	no	less
experienced	and	biased	than	investor-appointed	arbitrators.	The	presidents	handling	intra-EU	disputes	appear	to	be
(almost)	impartial.	The	weak	bias	of	presidents,	in	combination	with	the	similarly	strong	and	offsetting	biases	of	party-
appointed	arbitrators,	may	well	explain	the	relatively	low	success	rate	of	private	investors	in	intra-EU	cases	of	ISDS.
Calculating	the	‘consolidated’	bias	of	tribunals	toward	investors	or	states	by	summing	up	the	individual	biases	of	the
three	arbitrators,	the	evidence	indicates	that	arbitration	tribunals	which	tend	to	be	biased	toward	private	claimants
are	more	likely	to	decide	in	favour	of	investors,	or	to	reach	settlements	which	often	grant	investors	at	least	some
financial	compensation.	In	contrast,	arbitration	tribunals	biased	toward	respondent	states	tend	to	deny	jurisdiction	so
that	cases	are	discontinued,	or	to	decide	in	favour	of	EU	respondent	states.
The	good	news	for	EU	respondent	states	is	that	private	investors	win	fewer	intra-EU	disputes	than	one	might	have
expected.	Importantly,	however,	the	outcomes	of	intra-EU	ISDS	appear	to	depend	on	the	bias	of	arbitrators	and	the
composition	of	tribunals.	This	implies	that	arbitrator	selection	is	critically	important	for	respondent	states	to	fend	off
compensation	claims	and	discourage	‘frivolous	litigation’	by	private	investors.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	was	published	originally	by	LSE	Europp.	It	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	EU	Investors	versus
EU	States:	International	Arbitration	of	Investment	Disputes,	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies,	July	2018.
This	blog	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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